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NOTES.
RIGHT TO RECOVER ON MONOPOLISTIC CONTRACT.

There has been, perhaps, in recent years, no decision rendered in the United States Supreme Court, the effect of which
has been so misunderstood and misinterpreted, both by the laity
and by those members of the profession who have not had an
opportunity of reading the official report of the case, as that
rendered by the Court on February I, i9o9, in Continental Wall
Paper Company v. Voight and Sons Company, reported in

29

Supreme Court Reporter 28o, affirming the decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals, reported in 148 Federal Reporter 939.
The Continental Company brought suit in the Circuit Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, to recover a balance on an
account for goods sold and delivered to the defendant com(459)
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pany.. Defendant's answer contained six separate defenses,
demurrers to all of which were sustained, except as to the third
defense.
As shown by this defense, the facts, admitted by the demurrer, were about as follows: A ct al., firms and corporations
engaged in the manufacture of wall paper in various States,
formed the Continental Company for the purpose of controlling
the output of ninety-eight per cent. of the wall paper mills
of the United States, and to this end, made contracts with them
to buy their entire output at an agreed price. The Continental
Company was nominally to make all sales to wholesalers and
others, either directly or indirectly, at an agreed price, subject
to an agreed scale of discounts, according to an arbitrary classification of buyers. The difference between the price at which
the manufacturers sold to the company and the price exacted
from the buyers from the company constituted the dividends
to be distributed to the shareholders, who were composed exclusively of those controlling the combining manufacturers.
The only two manufacturers of wall paper machinery in the
United States were induced to become parties by agreeing not
to sell except to members of the combination. An agreement
was also made with Canadian manufacturers to prevent cutting
the price. Each member was required to deposit his shares
with the company, to be applied as liquidated damages in case
of a breach of the contract. Contracts were then made with
jobbers and wholesalers, binding them to buy their entire
requirements of the company, at specified prices, and not to
sell at less than the prices fixed by the company, on pain that
if they did not enter into such contracts they could not buy
at all. Defendant, under such a threat and fearing its impossibility to longer continue its business should it refuse to do so,
signed one of the agreements last mentioned. Defendant alleged that the prices sought to be recovered were fixed in pursuance of and by the combination agreement, and were excessive, and refused to pay same.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court, in an
opinion by Judge Lurton, affirmed the judgment. The Court
held that it was immaterial to the invalidity of the combination
that the agreement was valid at common law as imposing only
a reasonable restraint on competition, provided the direct result
of its operation was directly to restrain freedom of commerce
between the State or with foreign nations, in violation of the
anti-trust act of 189, often referred to as the "Sherman Anti'Act of July
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Trust Act." Speaking of the effect of the combination, Judge
Lurtoa said: "A more complete monopoly in an article of universal use has probably never been brought about It may be
that the wit of man may yet devise a more complete scheme to
accomplish the stifling of competition; but none of the shifts
resorted to for suppressing freedom of commerce and securing
undue prices, shown by the reported cases, is half so complete
in its details." And again, he says: "It must fall within the
definition of a 'restraint of trade,' whether we confine ourselves
to the common law interpretation of that term, or apply that
giyen to the term as used in the federal act."
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court, to which
the case was removed by writ of certiorari, was delivered by
Mr. Justice Harlan. The gist of the decision was that the
contract sought to be enforced was one which was, in fact, and
which was intended by the parties to be based upon agreements

that were essential parts of an illegal scheme.
The Anti-Trust Act of i8go declares illegal every contract,
combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, and declares it to be a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, to make any.such contract
or to engage in any such combination or conspiracy. It also
makes it a misdemeanor for any one to monopolize or attempt
to'monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations. The Act
further provides that any person injured in his business or
property by any other person or corporation violating the foregoing provisions, may recover from such wrongdoer treble
damages. As it was admitted by the demurrer that the plaintiff company had violated the Act, the question of whether the
combination was illegal did not arise. In a very important case
which came before the Circuit Court of Appeals ' it was held
that the contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade declared to be illegal in interstate and international
commerce by the Act of i8go, are the contracts, combinations
and conspiracies in restraint of trade that had been declared
by the courts to be against public policy and void under the
common law before the passage of the Act.
The contention of the plaintiff was, that admitting that it
was a "trust" or combination organized in violation of the
- ' United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 58 Fed. Rep.
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"Anti-Trust Act," yet that fact would not prevent the recovcring from the defendant corporation the price of the goods
purchased by the latter, and reliance was had on a case decided
in the United States Supreme Court in i9o2.' There, the defendant in an action brought by plaintiff company for the value
of goods sold him, disputed his liability upon the ground that,
at the time of the respective purchases, the company was part
of an illegal combination. Speaking for the Court, Mr. justice
Harlan, in refusing to hold the defense a good one, said: "The
illegality of such combination did not prevent the plaintiff corporation from selling pipe that it obtained from its constituent
companies, or either of them." He further said: "The purchases by the defendants had no necessary or direct connection with the alleged illegal combination for the contracts between the defendants and the plaintiff could have been proven
without any reference to the arrangement whereby the latter
became an illegal cimbination." A similar rule was laid down
in a Wisconsin case,' where it was said that "the mere fact that
the plaintiff is a member of a 'trust' will not prevent it in law
from selling goods within or affected by the provisions of such
trust, and recovering their price or value." The Court here held, however, that the Connolly case did
not apply, saying: "The present suit is based upon agreements
to which both the plaintiff and defendant were parties, and pursuant to which the accounts sued on were made out, and which
had for their object, and which it is admitted had directly the
effect to accomplish the illegal ends for which the Continental
Wall Paper Company was organized. If judgment be given
for the plaintiff, the result, beyond all question will be to give
the aid of the Court in making effective the illegal agreements
that constituted the forbidden combinations."
Mr. Justice Holmes, in a strong dissenting opinion, in which
Mr. Justice Brewer, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Peckham concurred, said that the case could not be distinguished
from the Connolly case, and that the defendant, having acquired a good legal title from the plaintiff, should be made to
pay for it. It must be admitted that there is much force in
what he says, but it is respectfully submitted that the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Harlan seems justified. The defendant's answer in the Connolly case simply alleged that the
sales in question were made to the defendant by the plaintiff
"in the ordinary course of its business as such trust or corn'Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., x84 U. S. s4CL

"National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wis. 352.
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bination aforesaid," wh.le in tbe present case, the defendant
alleged that the direct effect of the combination and agreements
(including the agreement signed by the defendant) was the
stifling of competition and the enhancing the price of wall
paper.
Aside from the reasons advanced by the minority of the
Court, it may be questioned whether the public policy which
prevents recovery in this case and allowed it in the Connolly
case is sound. In that case, the purchaser was forced by economic conditions to buy the plaintiff's product at unreasonable
prices, and was compelled to pay for it; in the present case the
purchaser by entering into an agreement with the vendor, aided,
in common with other vendees, in perfecting the illegal scheme,
and because of his participation in the forbidden acts, is absolved from paying for goods which he purchased from the
trust whose objects lie had helped to further. But whatever
may be the justice of this position, the law is well settled that
the Courts will do nothing to enforce an illegal contract,' and
the diversity of opinion among the members of the Court
turned mainly on the interpretation of the facts, the minority
holding that the agreement beween plaintiff and defendant,
whereby the latter promised not to buy from any other than
the plaintiff, was merely collateral to that between the plaintiff and the manufacturers, having as its object the control
of the product of the wall paper mills of the United States, and
the majority of the Court holding that both agreements constituted parts of the same illegal transaction, and that to allow
recovery in the case at bar would result in carrying out the
terms of an illegal contract, which is something that the Court
will not do. The case stands clearly on its own facts, and does
not overrule the Connolly case (supra), which decided that one
who purchased goods is not absolved from the duty of paying
for them on the ground that his vendor is part of an illegal
combination formed in restraint of trade and commerce.
' Embrey v. Jamjox,

131

U. S. 3A
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MAKING THE BREACH OF
CONTRACT CRIMINAL.

A LABOR

There is a section of the code of Alabama I which reads in
part: "Any person, who with intent to injure, or defraud his
employer, enters into a co'tract in writing for the performance
of any act or service and thereby obtains money or other personal property from such employer, and with like intent and
without -just cause and without refunding such money or
paying for such property, refuses or fails to perform such
act or service, must, on conviction, be punished by a fine in
double the damage suffered by the injured party, but not more
than three hundred dollars, one-half of said fine to go to the
county and one-half to the party injured;

*

*

*

And the

refusal of any person who enters into such contract to perform such act or service,
*

*

*

*

*

*

or refund such money

without just cause, shall be prima facie evidence of

the intent to injure his employer

*

*

*

or to defraud

hint"9
One A B had contracted to serve R with manual labor for
a year. At the time of signing the contract he was given fifteen
dollars and immediately thereafter began the performance of
his contractual obligations. The understanding was that some
time during his term of service the fifteen dollars were to be
returned. Weekly advances were given him as he performed
his labors. After he had served a short time he left the employment of R without making restitution of the fifteen dollars.
He was indicted under the statute quoted. In habeas corpus
proceedings, he contested the constitutionality of the act but it
was ruled against him. This decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Alabama.
The appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was
dismissed in Alonzo Bailey v. Alaba=a on the ground that the
constitutional question could not be reviewed on an appeal from
habeas corpus proceedings, that the cause was prematurely
appealed.3 At the final hearing A B was duly convicted by
a jury in the City Court of Montgomery, Alabama, on February 18, i9o9, from which verdict he has appealed to the
Supreme Court of the State.
He contends that the statute is unconstitutional (I) because
it amounts to a deprivation of liberty without due process of
'Code of Alabama, i9o7, VoL III, § 6845.
'29 Sup. Ct. Rep. r4! (i98).
' Harlan, J., dissents, believing that the constitutionality of the
statute should have been passed upon.
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law,' (2) in that it in effect is a species of involuntary5 servitude, (3) in being a violation of the peonage statute. He
rests his argument on the first ground on the fact that the
local courts, in applying the prima rule of evidence in the
statute, refuse to hear testimony of what was actually the state
of the defendant's mind when the money was received or the
contract broken. It may well be that as a matter-of expediency he may not be permitted to state the condition of his mind,
but will be confined to the introduction of facts which explain
his breach of contract to be bereft of the intention required
by the statute for conviction. Such refusal, in itself if applied
to similar conditions where the state of a man's mind is in question, could scarcely be attacked as a denial of "due process
of law." That the shifting of the burden of proof by a statutory
presumption, so long as it is reasonable, is constitutional is
generally recognized.7 Nor does the erroneous administration
of a statute make the statute any the less constitutional.'
The second contention is that by the rigidity of the statute
one is forced to undergo involuntary servitude through fear
of incurring the penalty for the breach of the contract, and that
the punishment itself partakes of the nature of a forced condition of servitude. That the thirteenth amendment was meant
to cover more than mere slavery is evident from the language
itself. Involuntary servitude covers every form of subjection,'
such as the peonage service, the Chinese coolie labor system, or
rites and customs peculiar to the Alaskian Indians. When an
apprentice contract is inordinately harsh it may be held involuntary, 0 as may be a contract for the service of a minor child
under conditions which abnegate consent."1 Ordinarily, however, when a man has entered contractual obligations, of his
plead a deprivation of his constitutional
own motion, he cannot
rights in this respect 12 In exceptional cases such as the seamen
'Federal Constitution, Section i of x4th Amendment.
'§ 1990 U. S. CoMp. St., x90x, p. 126
oP. 141 of Holmes, J., opinion in 29 Supt. Ct. Rep.
'Morgan v. State, 117 Ind. 569 (1888); Wigmore on Evid, VoL U,
S13554, PP. i67o-i672; Banks v. State, x24 Ga. x5.
'Del. Lack. & West. R. R. v. Pa., 198 U. S. 34t (i905).
IMiller, J., in The Slaughter Houses Cases, 16 Wall. 3,

72 (87a )

In Re Sah Sua. 3i Fed. 327 (1886).
" IMatter of Turner

I Abb. (U. S.)

Blkf. =~ (Ind.) (x82z).
1U. S. v. Ancarola, i Fed. 676 (iS8o).

84 (1867);

"Tyler v. Heidon, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 439 (886)
covenant).

Clark's Case

i
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contracts, men have even been forced to perform the services
required by the shipping articles. 3 Every person entering into
a contractual relation to a degree surrenders some of the personal freedom of which he is normally possessed, and economic
pressure alone cannot usually be denominated involuntary servitude. A statute making a mere breach of contract a crime
would be unconstitutional. However, under peculiar circumstances as the desertion on the part of seamen, or the abandonmnent of his duties by a train dispatcher, we have criminal acts,
though in reality they are mere breaches of contract. A statute
imposing the penalty of incarceration for the breach of a labor
contract similar to the one in question, but without the requisite of intent to defraud or injure the employer, after being
first upheld by the courts of South Carolina,14 was finally declared violative of the constitutional inhibition in an exhaustive
opinion." It has always been a well recognized power of the
State to pass laws punishing fraud springing from breach of
contracts. Thus the courts have held that punishment of a
debtor by imprisonment for unjustly and fradulently refusing
to apply money or property within his hands to the payment
of a debt is not a violation of a statute prohibiting imprisonment for debt. 1' In Georgia and North Carolina 12statutes,
providing penalties for breaking labor contracts like the one
in question were upheld on the ground of punishment for
fraud. For the same reason a statute was sustained in Louis-

iana,1s though it was admitted in the language of the court that
if it were "an attempt on the part of the employer because of his
laborer's indebeduess to compel him to continue to perform
his daily task the result would in all probability be different."
Punishment for fraud will therefore be upheld though it may
tend indirectly to force a laborer, through timidity, to carry
out h;s contract. Indeed, this has been the rationale of a de-

cision upholding this very statute in an earlier Alabama case."
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 273 (1897); contra, when the contract was vot entered into voluntary; In Re Chung Fat, 96 Fed. 2W
(r889). Compulsion in working off a highway tax is not held involuntary; Matter of Dassler, 35 Kan. 684 (1886).
"State v. Chapman, 56 So. Ca. 42o (if8); State v. Easterlin, 61 So.
Ca. 71 (1901).
'Ex Parte Hollman, 6o S. E. 19 (So. Ca. x9o8).
"Ex pare Clarke, 2o N. J.648 (i846).
"Lamar v. Stale, 120 Ga. 312 (19o3); Banks v.State, 124 Ga. i5
(i9o5); State v. Norman, sxo No. Ca. 484 (j89a).
"State v. Murray, ix6 La. 655 (1906).
"State v.Thomas, 144 Ala. 77 (igo6).
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In contradistinction we might mentiox an earlier statute- in
the same State which made it a misdemeanor for a person to
break a contract and enter into a similar one with another employer without divulging his ptior obligation. 0 That statute
was declared unconstitutional, for it was a criminal punishment for a mere breach of contract. Let us consider the argument that it is a violation of the peonage statute. The basal
fact of peonage is indebtedness. 21 Peonage in whatever manner
it has its inception is involuntary. The peon must perform
his labor to discharge his indebtedness. Until then he is bound
absolutely and will be forced to perform the work as contracted.
An ordinary contract of labor in discharge of a debt may be
broken at any time and the breach will be satisfied by dam-.
ages;22 peonage is compulsory and involuntary service and
can only be satisfied when the debt is absolved. Until then
the peon's service may be sold or assigned to another and he
is bound thereby to serve his new master. A statute which
makes a mere breach of contract a criminal offense might very
well be argued to militate against the spirit if not the letter of
the peonage statute.2
There is at least one other plausible objection against the
statute in question, namely, that it is a violation of the fourteenth amendment in that it is a "denial of the equal protection
of the laws," in legislating against the breach of a particular
kird of contract by one party to it. As it stands it would
seem that an employer with the most consummate fraudulent
intention might bind any number of laborers to him and then
with perfect impunity break his contracts and be mulcted in
damages only according to the rules of damages for breach
of contract. However, the reasonableness of a discriminatory
legislation which applies equally to all the members of a particular class, has upheld statutes which on their face seem
unconstitutional. 21 The justification for statutes of this nature
is given by Jones, .J., in his dissenting opinion in ex parts
Hollynan,2" in which he points out the lamentable consequences
that would result if more drastic measures were not adopted
Toney v. State, 14z Ala. xo (1904).
.Joremillo v. Romero, z N. M. zgo 080y).
Ctyait V. U. S., 197 (L F.) U. S. 2o7 (x9os). See also language
of Woods, J., italicized, in Er parte Hollman, p. 24.
" Peonage Case% z23 Fed. 671 (Ala. 19o3).
"Lochner v. Nw York, x98 U. S. 45 (j5).
16o S. E.(to6, So. Ca.) at p. 33.

*
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to prevent the promiscuous breach of contracts by dishonest
laborers in these peculiar conditions.
It would seem therefore that the statute considered, in letter
at least, falls within the pale of the constitutional amendments
in question.

CONVEYANCES ON A PAROL TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF A THIRD
PARTY AS AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS..

Where A conveys property to B on the latter's parol promise
to hold in trust for C, the problem whether or not the trust
is enforceable against C when he repudiates it, in view of the
Statute of Frauds, may be divided into two parts according as
B's promise is made (x) bona fide or (2) with no intent to
perform.
Where the parol promise is honestly made and later the
trust is repudiated by B, he could not in justice be allowed to
keep the subject matter of the trust. Neithcr should C be allowed to enforce the trust because this would be a complete
abrogation of the Statute of Frauds;' but the contrary view
has at least one decision in its favor.2 B, however, is unconscionably holding property which belongs to the grantor A, and
equity having jurisdiction to compel a return of the specific
property should so decree.' This conclusion has been arrived
at in several cases.'
Where there has been no fraudulent promise, but where B
has been active in procuring the conveyance to himself,--and
this activity may consist in "procuring a title from another
which he [B] could not have obtained except by a confidence
reposed in him" '-it has been urged that the case is different
from a mere parol promise with no such activity.6 It is submitted, however, that every such promise is an inducement of
the conveyance; for without the promise the conveyance would
'Salter v. Bird, m03Pa. 436 (883).
2
Smoke v. Smoke, xx Va. L Reg. 747 (Va. Circ. Ct 19o6).
' See Note in 57 U. P. L Rev. 403 (19o9).

Ga. 295 (z86o); Peacock v. Peacock, So
Cf. Rochefoucasdd v. Eons:ead, L. .
[1897], i Ch. Div. 196; In Re Davis, ir2 Fed. 129 (Dist. Mass. igox).
'Siechrist's App., 66 Pa. 237 (1870).
'McKinney v. Burns,

31

Mo. 256, 261 (1872), dictum.

'A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, by J. N. Pomeroy, sec. i55,
Note a
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certainly not be made. Hence the rule suggested would lead to
the enforcement of all such parol trusts and the abrogation of
the statute. Further, the active inducement would seem to
be no reason why C should enforce; and since, without this
inducement, a-trust would none the less be 'raised for A, there
would seem to be no need for the distinction.
In the second class of cases where the promise was made with
no intexition to perform, some jurisdictions have allowed C to
enforce,' as in the case of devises, where C is generally successful.2 Explanations offered for such a conclusion are (x)
That thus equity takes from the wrongdoer. the fruits of his
deceit; * (2) That equity gives specific reparation for the tort.'
It is submitted that as to the first, were it admitted that it is
within the province of equity to punish fraudulent acts, the
same result is obtained by raising a trust in A's favor. As
to the second, the fact that what prevents A from doing what
he ought to have done to accomplish his object is a tort, makes
no difference as to C. The correct conclusion would seem to
be the same as that reached where the promise is bona fide, i. e.,
a resulting trust for A. In a recent case of this latter class,
Ballinger v. Ballinger, 99 Pac. i96 (Cal. 19o8), where C was
both heir and intended cestui que trust, the Statute of Frauds
was not pleaded, probably because the rule allowing C to enforce either as the intended cestui que trust or as the heir of
A as resulting cestui que trust was thought to be too well settled to be disturbed, and the express trust was enforced.
DEFAMATION OF A PUBLIC OFFICER IN A NEWSPAPER

The reports contain many cases in which a public officer
or a candidate for public office has brought an action of libel
against a newspaper for being falsely accused by it of corruption, want of integrity, or crime. One of the defenses invariably is that the publication was justified, since it was concerned with a matter of public interest, and that a newspaper
has a duty to keep the public informed of all matters concern-

tFichbeck v. Gross, 112 IL 2o8 (1884); Johnston v. Rely, 66
N. J. Eq. 451 (I9o4); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313 (z8);
Cf. Ahrens v. Joxes, 169 N. Y. s5s (xgoa).
'Hoge v. Hoge, r Watts. 163 (x832); Amherst v. Ritch, x$I N. Y.
282 (189).
'A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, by J. N. Pomeroy, Sec.
oSL-6.
"*See Note in 20 Nary. L Rev. 403 (1Q07).
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ing their candidates and officers, and if it makes a mistake it
is not liable because the occasion is privileged.
Such were the facts in the recent case of Tanner v. Embree.1
The Court held that a newspaper stands in no better position
than any one else in the community in the right to discuss in
public print the character and conduct of one who is a public
officer or a candidate for office, and that the false statements
were not justified under a plea of privilege, since no one may
publish any false facts which charge a public officer with want
of integrity or corruption. The right, however, of a newspaper, or any person in the commmity, to comment fairly upon
or criticise the acts and character of a public officer was not
denied.
It is one of the elementary principles of the law of libel
that a publication otherwise libellous will not be actionable
if it was made in good faith, under a state of facts making
it right in the interests of society for one person to communicate
to others what he believes or has heard regarding any person's
conduct or character. This is called an occasion of qualified
privilege. 2 Actual malice destroys the privilege.
It has been denied that the right to comment upon and criticise matters of public interest is a privilege. Thus, in Campbell.
v. Spoliswoode,3 it was pointed out that this right is the right
of every citizen, and is to be distinguished from a privileged
occasion. In the words of the Court: "If it could be shown
that the editor of a newspaper stands in a privileged position,
it would be necessary to prove actual malice. But no authority has been cited for that proposition; and I take it to be certain that he has only the general right which belongs to the
public to comment on public matters. * * * In such cases
every one has the right to make fair and proper comment; and,
so long as it is within that limit, it is no libel." 4 This view
is seen in several cases in this country.$ In a late English case'
99 Pac. 547 (Calif., 9og).
*Pollockc: Torts, 269 (8th ed.); Cooley: Torts, 423 (3rd ed.).
'3 B. & S. 769 (1863).
'!bid: per Blackburn, J., 781.
In Henwood v. Harrison, L. R. 7, C. P. 6o6. decided in i875, it
was held that the right to comment on matters of public interest was
a privilege. But in Merivale v. Carson, L. R. 2o R. B. D. 275, both
views were discussed and the view of Campbell v. Spottiswoode was
expressly adopted
'Marks v. Baker, 28 Minn. T62 (1881); Bearce v. Bass, 88 Maine
521 (x896); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., x54 Mass. 238 (i89x).
"Thomas v. Co., L R. 2 K. B. 627 (igo6). See Odgers: Libel
(4th ed.), 86.
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it is denied that there is any distinction between an occasion
which gives rise to fair comment and one that gives rise to a
privilege. In this case the defense was that the publication
was fair comment on a matter of public interest. The plafitiff
then offered evidence of actual malice. It was contended that
this was not admissible, even admitting that actual malice would
destroy privilege, since the motive with which the comment
was made was immaterial, provided that it did not state any
facts outside the scope of fair comment. The Court held, that
the right to comment and the right to make communications concerning a servant, for instance, were the same right, though
the limits of the rights differed.
Regarding this as a correct analysis, the question arises
as to what general facts distinguish the right to criticise the
acts of a public officer and other cases of privilege, for instance,
in giving the character of a servant. In both cases, the existence and extent of privilege in communications are determined by balancing the needs and good of society against the
right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation when he has
done nothing which ought to injure it. "The privilege should
always cease where the sacrifice of the individual right becomes
so great that the public good to be derived from it is outweighed." I "But by a false statement of a fact concerning a
servant made to one intending -to employ that servant, the
loss of reputation of the servant is limited to one or at most
a few persons, while in the case of a publication in a newspaper
concerning a public officer, if false facts are stated his reputation will be injured in the whole community, and, besides, the
public have an equal interest in the maintenance of the public
character of public men; and public affairs could not be conducted by men of honour with a view to the .welfare of the
county, if we were to sanction attacks upon them, destruction
of their honor and character, and made without any founda-

tion."

It remains to point out what are the limits of the privilege

of fair comment. But first, what is such a matter of public
interest as to give rise to this privilege would seem to be a
matter for the Court? ' It is, however, universally held that a
public officer or a candidate for public office lays himself open
to comment and criticism.10 It also seems well settled that the
'Per Taft, J., in Post Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 540.
1Per Cockburn, C. J., in Campbell v. Spoftiswoode, 3 B. & S. 777.
SMcQuire v. Co., 88 Law Times, 757; Garret v. Briggs, III Pa. 404.
"Cooley: Torts (3rd ed.), 442.
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cditor of a newspaper stands in no better position than an)
other citizen as to what can be published."1
The limit of the privilege may be stated to be that if false
facts are stated the publication is libellous, while if the cornment is such as the jury believe to be honest and relevant from
the actual facts then it is not libellous. Thus, in the recent case
of Hubbard v. Allyn, 22 the defendant., a member of a board

of health, published that the plaintiff, a grocer, had purchased
vanilla for $2.75 a gallon. This statement of the price was
false. Arguing from the price, the defendant concluded that
the plaintiff was either "criminally stupid or deliberately dishonest." It was held that the defendant bad exceeded the
bounds of privilege. "Ridicule, sarcasm and invective may be
employed. But the basis must be a fact, and not a falsehood." "
There are a few cases, however, which hold that false statements of facts can be made about a public officer."' The case
of Briggs v. Garret"' is sometimes cited for this proposition,
though the Court sought to distinguish it on the ground that
the publication was privileged because it simply stated that a
public officer who was a candidate for re-election* had been
charged with a crime. "Is not the fact that a candidate is
charged with crime by reputable citizens, a matter proper for
public information?"
It is submitted that the weight of authority is in favor of
the view expressed in Tanner v. Etmbree.1t
THE RIGHT OF THE ASSIGNEE OF A NON-NEGOTIABLE CHOSE IN

ACTION TO SuE IN His

OwN NAmE.

"B contracted with A to manufacture ten monuments at a
fixed price. B assigned the contract to C (plaintiff) as security
for materials furnished. C notified A of the assignment and
'Davison v. Duncan, 7 El. & BL 229, per Coleridge, J. (i856);
Upton v. Hume, 21 L.R. A. 493 (1893); Negley v. Farrow,6o Md. 158
(1882); Morse v. Prini;ngCo., 124 Iowa, 707 (904).
" 86 N. B. 336 (Mass., 1909).

' 3See also Burt v. Advertiser Co., 154 Maa. 238; Slar Pub. Co. v.
Donahue, 58 AtL 513 (Del, xgo4).
"Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa 533 (1877); State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465
(i8a4).
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404 0i886).

' Burtr
v. Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238; Star Pub. Co. v. Dqnahue,
58 Atl. 513; Farley v.McBride, 103 N. W. 1o36 (Neb., i9o5); Cole v.
A,,dre-cs, 76 N. W. 962 (Minn., 1898); Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich. 583
(x890).
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requested that A pay the money due under the contract to
him, C. A acknowledged C's request by letter and promised
C that he would pay him if B furnished the monuments as
per contract. In an action by C against A, Held: The transaction was an assignment of a non-negotiable chose in action as
security for a debt, and not a novation entitling C to sue in
his own name for the sum due to B from A for the monuments."

Barre Granite Co. v. Fraser, 7z Atl. Rep. 828 (Sp.

Ct. of Vermont, Jan. 21st, i9o9). The above decision brings
tip the interesting question as to the right of an assignee of a
contract at common law to sue in his own name where the
debtor has acknowledged the assignment and has promised the
assignee that he will make payment to him, although his original
creditor has not given him a release from liability.
As pointed out by Professor Ames in his article on "Novation", 1 the doctrine of novation had no place in the ancient common law, for since the action of assumpsit was then unknown,
the new obligor could be sued, if at all. only in debt; but there
could be no debt in the absence of a quid pro quo-and the fiew
obligor in reality received nothing in exchange for his assumption of another's obligation. With the advent of assumpsit,
however, the doctrine of novation came into use very quicdy.
In the early English case of Roe v. Haugh1 the court alleged that B was indebted to C in the sum of -42 and that
A, ,in consideration that Cwould accept A as his debtor for
the sum of 42, undertook and promised C to pay him £42,
and that C, trusting to A's promise, accepted A as his debtor.
It was insisted that this was a void assumpsit in an action
by C against A, for except B was discharged A could not
be chargeable. It would seem that the English rule at the
present time is to require the consideration of forbearance
or some other new consideration to enable the assignee to sue
in his own name. Likewise, in a case where A owes B and
B owes C in the same sum, and it is agreed that A shall pay
C, C cannot sue A unless by the agreement he, A, is released
from his liability to B, or there is other consideration, for should
he still remain liable there would be no consideration for A's
promise to pay Cs
'6 Harvard Law Review, 184.
2

jSalk 29 0697).

*Euton v. Chadley, 3 B. and C. 59'; Wharton v. Walker, 4 B. and
C. 163; Taylor v. Higgins, 3 East, i69; Leveridge v. Broadhurst, 4 H.
& N. 6*3.

NOTES

While the English law at the present time is as stated above,
there is the case of Israel v. Douglas I which throws some
doubt as to whether or not it was always so. In that case
"A was indebted to B for brokerage, and B was indebted
to C for money lent. B gave an order to A to pay C the
sum due from A to B, as a security upon which C lent B a
further sum. The order was accepted by A. Held, upon A'S
refusal to comply with the order, C might have an action for
money had and received against A." There was no allegation
that A was released from his obligation to B. The assignment
by B of his rights under the contract was held to operate as
an equitable release of the old claim of B against A and furnish the consideration for the promise of A to pay C; and
when with this knowledge A makes a direct promise to C to
pay the debt there seems to be no reason why an action cannot
name. 'This view of the
be maintained thereon by C in his own
law is supported by Fenner v. Mears.s
In America the view of Lord Loughborough in Israel v.
Douglas (supra) has had greater influence; with the result
that in many jurisdictions the assignee of' a non-negotiable
chose in action may sue thereon in his own name, although the
debtor be not expressly released from his liability to the assignor, provided that the assignment be acknowledged by the
debtor and a promise made by him to the assignee. The leading
American case is that of Crocker v. Whitney.6 There was an
assignment by A to B of a debt due from C to A; an assent
on the part of C to the assignment and an express promise
by him to B to pay accordingly. Held: B may maintain an
action in his own name against C. The court said: "The
general principle has long been well settled that such an assignment, with notice to the defendant, imposes on him an
equitable and moral obligation to pay the money to the assignee, and although such an obligation is not sufficient to
support an implied assumpsit so as to enable the assignee to
maintain an action in his own fiame, yet it is a good consideration for an express promise to that effect." This view has
been followed subsequently in Massachusetts.' In Vermont,
where it will be observed the principal case was decided, in the
case of Moar v. Wright s it was held that the assignment of
Oz1-. Black, 239 0789).
82 Win. Black, 1269 (79).
aso Mass. 316.
'Mowry v. Todd, 12 Mass 281.
0z Vermont, 5L
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a chose in action for a valuable consideration is sufficient to
support a promise of the debtor to make payment to the assignee. In a later case, Trow v. Braley,9 A owed B for work;
B assigned the debt to C; C gave notice to A of the assignment and A promised to pay C. Held: That there was a good
consideration for the promise of A to C, "the assignment of
the debt, for a valuable consideration, with notice to the debtor,
is a sufficient consideration for his promise to pay the same to
the assignee."
In Pennsylvania this view is followed in the case of DuBarry
Y. Withers.10 In an action by an assignee on a chose in action

assignable in equity, Read, J., said: "As the assignee is the
real owner, it would seem but just, if the debtor chose expressly
to promise to the assignee to pay the debt to him, that the assigilce might maintain an action against him in his own name."
Dy way of dictum he continued: "And this is clearly the sound
rule, for it is a promise to pay the real owner of the debt, re(Iinring no other consideration than the fact that the debtor
6.morally and equitably bound to pay it to his actual creditor,
and is not allowed to discharge himself by paying it to any othcr
has been followed in New Hampshire"
person." This view
and in Maryland. 2
In none of the above American cases does it appear that the
a-signee has released his assignor of his liability or that the
assignor has released the debtor of his original liability.

COMMON LAw REMIEIES OF THE STATE COURTS IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The recent casc of Missouri R. R. v. Larabee Flour Co.,
sustained the jurisdiction of the State2 court to enforce by
mandamus the common law duty of a carrier not to discriminate in supplying cars for interstate shipments at an established station. The plaintiff ceased to supply the defendant
because of a dispute over prior service.- This duty was not
s6Verot, 60
"44 Pa.356
Currier v. Hodgson, 3 N. H. 82; Thompson Y. Emery, 7 Foster.
269 (N. H.).
"Allsaton v. Costee, 4 H. & J. 351.
U. S. 6a.
174 Kans. 8o8; 88 Pa=. 72.
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imposed by any State or Federal statute except in so far as
general power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and discrimination was declared unlawful by the act
of 1887.
The Supreme court based its decision upon the reasoning of
those cases' in which State legislatures, in the exercise of
police power in matters of local concern, had incidentally regulated interstate commerce. The minority, reasoning from
similar cases,5 came to the conclusion that this was a
direct regulation in matters of national concern over which
control was vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission;
that carriers should .not be subject to conflicting regulations
or be left uncertain as to which government may rightfully
assert its controlling authority; and that since the legislature
could not legislate concerning the matter, the State courts had
no jurisdiction.
The minority contended that this case was controlled by
McNiel v. Southern R. R.
in that case, a State commission ordered a carrier to deliver cars to a shipper over a private track to a place off from the regular line of service. It
was exercising a legislative function and making rules for
the regulation of transportation outside of the common law
duties of a carrier and those imposed by Congress in such a
way as to burden interstate traffic. In this case, Congress has
declared the duty and the State court is merely enforcing that
duty under the common law as declared by Congress. Here
the carrier has established the track and the station and assumed the duties of a common carrier towards all who apply
for transportation. Congress has made the regulation, not
the State, and the Court is enforcing such regulation. There
is no burden imposed upon interstate traffic by the State.
That the interstate carrier is subject to the common law
duties, in so far as they have not been abrogated by Congress, and that both the State and Federal courts have con224 Stat. at L 379; 34"Stat. at L 584.
"Cleveland R. R. v. IlL, i77 U. S. 514 (i899); Cooky v. Port
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (i8Sz); Mo. R. R. v. Hober, x68U. S. 613;
(1897).
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat- 1 (824) ; McNeil v. Southern R. R,
292 U. S. W4(195).
SSupr.
1Murray v. R. R., 62 Fed 24 (894); 92 Fed. 868 (i89g); Western
Union v. Call., 18i U. S. 92 (igo); Atchinson R. R. v. Denver R. R.,
11o U. S. 667 (884).
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current jurisdiction,* subject to the Constitution and laws
of the United States, is no longer open to question. Congress itself has declared' that "nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this act are in addition to such remedies."
While it is true that the reasonableness of a rate published
according to law is conclusive upon both State and Federal
courts"1 and that jurisdiction as to its reasonableness
exists only in the Commission, and that the common law as
to reasonableness of such rate has been abrogated, yet State
statutes enforcing the common law liability as- to the common
carrier's liability for the transportation of goods" 1 and
passengers 1 2 have been upheld as well as State statutes
requiring reasonable service by interstate carriers;"3 permitting discrimination by telegraph 1 companies in its service; and defining the liability for fires'l caused by the
interstate carrier's negligence, in so far as they were declaratory of the common law duties. But, where such statutes conflicted with the general common law of fellow-servant 1 ' or
were in conflict with the Federal laws,17 they were held
unconstitutional. So also it has been held that the States
have control of navigable streams;"$ that they may determine the rights of riparian owners "' and regulate the construction of bridges, 20 so long as an act of Congress is not in
conflict.
It would thus appear that State statutes, which are passed
'Martin v. Hunter, z Wheat. 339 (i816) ; Cooley on Const. Limitations (6th ed.) A8
'34 Stat. at L 387, se.. 2.
" Texas R. R. v. Abiline, 2o4 U. S. 426 (z9o6).
'Mo. R. R. v. McCann, 174 U. S. 58o (z899).
"Chicago R. R. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 (1898).
"Lake Shore R. R. v. Ohio, x73 U. S. 285 (1899); Cleveland R. R.

v. ill., 177 U. S. 514.
" Western Union v. Call, r8i U. S. 92; Cumberland Co. v. Kelly,
i6o Fed. 316 (z9o8).
'Atchison R. R. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96 (1899).
"B. & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, T49 U. S. 368 (1893).
"Louisville R. R. v. Stock Yards Co., 192 U. S. 68 (I904); 212
U. S.

132 (Io9).

" St. Clair Co. v. Interstate Co., 192 U. S. 454 (1904).
"Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 93 (x9o6).
"Giltan v. Philadelphia,3 Wall. 213 (x86;).
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for the public health. safety, public morals or public convenience, : ' which are declaratory of duties under the general
common law or Federal statutes, are constitutional so long
as they do not conflict with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
While the action of State legislatures is limited by the limitations of the Commerce clause and the acts of Congress, there
is no such limitation upon the power of the State courts.
"The limitations," says Mr. Justice Shiras,22 "upon the
legislative power of the natin and of the several States do
not necessarily apply to the judicial branches of the National
and State governments. The legislature of a State cannot
abrogate or modify any of the provisions of the Federal Constitution nor the Acts of Congress touching matters within
Congressional control, but the courts of the State, in the
absence of prohibitory provision in the Federal constitution
or the acts of Congress have full jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. If

the law applicable to a .given case is of Federal origin, the
legislature of a State cannot abrogate or change it, but the
courts of the State may apply and enforce it, and hence the
fact that a given subject, like interstate commerce, is beyond
State legislative control, does not, ipso facto, prevent the
courts of the State from exercising jurisdiction." It may be
called a ruling principle of the Constitution, to interfere as
little as possible between the citizen and his own State government; and hence, with a few safeguards of a very general
nat-are, the executive, legislative and judicial functions are
left as they were, as to their own citizens and as to all internal
concerns.2 8 It is plain, that the framers of the Constitution did contemplate that cases within the judicial cognizance
of the United States, not only might but would arise in the
State courts in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction.
With this view the supremacy clause of the sixth article of
the Constitution was drawn up. This obligation is imperative
upon the State judges, in their official, and not merely in
their private, capacities. From the very nature of their judicial duties, they would be called upon to pronounce the law
applicable to the case in judgment. They were not to decide
merely according to the laws or constitution of the State but
" Lake Shore R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 29.
"Murray v. R. R.. 62 Fed. 24.

* Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 281 (1827).
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accord'ng to the constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States.? This conccurrent jurisdiction of the State courts
has been considerably discussed in numerous cases25 but
in no case has it been held that the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts over the laws of the United States, is exclusive except
where such fact results from express declaration " in, or necessary implication 21 from the Constitution and laws of the
United States. The present case does not fall under either
class so the jurisdiction of the State court properly attaches.
'Martin v.Hunter, i Wheat. 339 (186).

'MCohens v.Va.. 6 Wheat.
135 (189o).

417 (1821) ; R. R. Co. -V. Miss.,

'In re Hahorst, i5o U. S. 661 (1.393).
"Texas R. R. v.Abiline, supra.
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